Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2019

The Digitalization of Development: Understanding the Role of
Technology and Innovation in Development through a Case Study
of Kenya and M-Pesa
Kara Schachter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses
Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Schachter, Kara, "The Digitalization of Development: Understanding the Role of Technology and
Innovation in Development through a Case Study of Kenya and M-Pesa" (2019). CMC Senior Theses.
2062.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2062

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Claremont McKenna College

The Digitalization of Development: Understanding
the Role of Technology and Innovation in
Development through a Case Study of Kenya and
M-Pesa

Submitted to Professor Roderic Camp

by Kara Schachter
for Senior Thesis
Fall Semester 2018
December 10, 2018

2

3

Abstract
This thesis analyzes the connection of mobile phone technology to increased
economic development in Kenya. Drawing on previous research, I first examine the state
of development by analyzing social, political, and economic factors in Kenya in
2007/2008. I then examine the role of technology on these development factors in Kenya
by focusing on the rapid rise of mobile money platform M-Pesa and the rise of
decentralized banking. This thesis finds that M-Pesa’s success stems from the failure of
public trust in traditional institutions, collaboration between the public, private, and
nonprofit sector, initial lack of regulation to promote innovation, and heavy consumer
testing to create the best product-market fit. Additionally, in comparison to other subSaharan countries, Kenya’s institutions have more willingly allowed for nontraditional
methods of investment and aid. While none of these results are entirely conclusive,
evidence suggests that the rise of mobile money and technological innovation has
attributed heavily to economic development into 2018, but that social and political
development factors are still restrained. Ultimately, technology is not the solution to all
factors of cyclical poverty, but it can create new approaches to previously neglected
development constraints.
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I. Introduction and Literature Review
M-Pesa, the mobile-phone based payment and financing system, was launched in
2007 by Safaricom, the largest mobile network operator in Kenya. With over 22 million
current users, M-Pesa revolutionized fiscal opportunity for both urban and rural
households. When first introduced, less than 20% of the Kenyan population had access to
a mobile phone or service. Today, 93% of all Kenyans have access to a mobile phone,
with 84% using it every day.1
This thesis aims to first examine the development factors present in Kenya that
allowed for M-Pesa to revolutionize Kenyan business, energy, and agriculture. As well as
comparing additional mobile payment advances and startup technologies in East Africa,
this thesis analyzes how technology can be utilized in Kenya to keep up with the modern
technological revolution while also aiding in basic development needs across SubSaharan Africa.
Mobile payment may seem to be taken for granted for those living in much of the
western world, where applications such as PayPal and Venmo, and ApplePay have
dominated business for over a decade. However, mobile payments via short-messaging
service (SMS), which are usually considered less technologically advanced, have
disrupted the way in which much of East Africa economically develops. Especially in
Kenya, the mobile payment boom disrupted the way in which millions conduct business,
run households, and educate themselves without the necessities of paved roads, vehicles,
and nonviolence.

Afrobarometer, “Afrobarometer: Kenya Results 2017” (Afrobarometer, 2017),
http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online.
1
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Since the mid-2000s, there has been a growing abundance of literature focusing
on the direct effect of technology and economic development, particularly regarding
agriculture and the economic impact on commodity-driven economies. One of the first
studies on the intersection of technology and economic development occurred in India,
where micro-level studies proved the positive impact that technology had in informationsharing and determining pricing of South Indian fisheries.2 With lacking information,
those participating in agriculture or fishing relied on a level of arbitrage to make a living.
However, when given access to information-sharing technology, results displayed “a
dramatic reduction in price dispersion, the complete elimination of waste, and nearperfect adherence to the Law of One Price.” 3 These conclusions confirmed that
technology aided in the increased overall welfare for both the consumer and producer. 4
The affiliation of development research between India and Sub Saharan Africa is beyond
circumstantial; in the past decade, India was one of the most rapidly developing countries
in the world. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the top developing areas, especially as
growth shifts from the commodity-driven West Africa to a burgeoning service,
technology, and investment-focused East Africa.5 In 2018, based on an approach of
using “a single measure of each country’s economy which captures the diversity and
sophistication of the productive capabilities embedded in a country’s exports,” India’s
economy is predicted to grow 7.9%, followed by Uganda with 7.5% growth, Tanzania as

Robert Jensen, “The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and Welfare in the
South Indian Fisheries Sector,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 3 (2007): 879–924.
3
Ibid
4
Ibid
5
Harvard University, “The Atlas of Economic Complexity by Harvard Center for International
Development,” Atlas of Economic Complexity, http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/growth-projections/.
2
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the fourth largest developing economy with 6.15% growth, and Kenya as the tenth largest
developing economy with 5.87% growth.6
Following the conclusions that access to technology reduced arbitrage, several
studies confirmed and expanded on the positive economic impact of access to technology
providing pricing and information in West Africa. Many scholars originally placed a
focus on mobile phone usage rather than the usage of internet, as it has had an irregular
penetration rate7. As of 2017, internet penetration across Sub-Saharan Africa is 19.85%8
and mobile phone penetration is 44% in the region.9 It was also concluded that mobile
phones played a significant role in a quicker and cheaper supply chain.10 In Niger, “the
introduction of mobile phone service between 2001 and 2006 explains a 10 to 16 percent
reduction in grain price dispersion. The effect is stronger for market pairs with higher
transport costs.”11 However, in more recent years, the direct results of mobile phones in
Niger were heterogeneous when examining the actual crop production and yield. 12
Furthermore, the implications for the rest of society are ambiguous, as only the early
adopters of mobile technology benefited from initial pricing equalities.13 In Cameroon, it

6

Ibid
Simplice Asongu, “Mobile Phone Innovation and Technology-Driven Exports in Sub-Saharan Africa,”
MPRA Paper, last modified January 2017,https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84040/.
8
World Bank, “Access to Electricity,” World Bank Data, last modified 2018,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=KE.
9
Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association, “The Mobile Economy - Sub-Saharan Africa 2018,” The Mobile
Economy - Sub-Saharan Africa 2018, accessed December 1, 2018,
https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/sub-saharan-africa/.
10
Jenny C Aker and Isaac M Mbiti, “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 24, no. 3 (August 2010): 207–232.
11
Jenny C. Aker, “Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural Markets in
Niger,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (July 2010): 46–59.
12
Jenny C. Aker and Christopher Ksoll, “Can Mobile Phones Improve Agricultural Outcomes? Evidence
from a Randomized Experiment in Niger,” Food Policy 60, Towards a Food Secure Future: Ensuring Food
Security for Sustainable Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (April 1, 2016): 44–51.
13
Aker, “Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural Markets in Niger,”
2010.
7
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was discovered that the effect of technology on pricing varies between vegetables.14 As
the Sub-Saharan economy has only begun to shift away from commodities, most
published work focuses more on the direct effects of technology for individual farming
households. However, there has been a positive correlation between access to technology
and technological goods and services exports.15 Previous work has proven technology’s
role towards significant improvements in the commodity market. In contrast, this paper
will examine East rather than West Africa, aim to approach the impact of technology
beyond commodities, and analyze interrelated macro-economic and social development
trends for individuals, startups, and global business opportunities as the East African
market expands.
Additionally, initial studies evaluating effective governance of knowledge and
intellectual property (IP) from the early to mid 2000s determined that technology had less
effects on the financial market than other factors (such as political stability).16 In more
recent years, there have been more significant results.17 The intersection of globalization,
wealth, and technology has recently had a positive effect on corruption, technology
driven goods and services, and education than during previous studies in the previous
decade.18 Few have focused on the specific technologies used, but rather what purposes
they are used for. In recent years, reports from Safaricom, the creator of M-Pesa, African

J. R. Minkoua Nzie, J. C. Bidogeza, and Nkwah Azinwi Ngum, “Mobile Phone Use, Transaction Costs,
and Price: Evidence from Rural Vegetable Farmers in Cameroon,” Journal of African Business 19, no. 3
(July 3, 2018): 323–342.
15
Simplice Asongu, “Mobile Phone Innovation and Technology-Driven Exports in Sub-Saharan Africa,”
MPRA Paper, last modified January 2017,https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84040/.
16
Antonio Rodríguez Andrés, Simplice A. Asongu, and Voxi Amavilah, “The Impact of Formal
Institutions on Knowledge Economy,” Journal of the Knowledge Economy 6, no. 4 (2015): 1034–1062.
17
Ibid.
18
Antonio R. Andrés and Simplice A. Asongu, “Fighting Software Piracy: Which Governance Tools
Matter in Africa?,” Journal of Business Ethics 118, no. 3 (2013): 667–682.
14
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venture capital fund Venture for Africa, nongovernmental organizations, and several
filmmakers have captured the first-hand testimonies of the effect of technology on East
Africa, but in-depth analysis is not exceedingly present. It has also been previously
established that the creation and access to technology has improved educational quality in
developing countries. Specifically, in Africa, “positive marginal effects are apparent in
the roles of education quality and scientific output on technology goods exports and
technology service exports respectively while negative marginal impacts are apparent in
the roles of scientific output and educational quality on technology goods exports and
technology service exports.”19
Finally, a vast amount of development literature exists to understand the overall
factors of development and historical development patterns. This paper relied on Paul
Collier’s analysis of absolute poverty and the bottom billion, and what can be done to
improve their welfare.20 He argues that: “Change is going to have to come from within
the societies of the bottom billion, but our own policies could make these efforts more
likely to succeed, and so more likely to be undertaken.”21 This thesis explores Kenya’s
booming entrepreneurial economy as one of the more modern examples of collaboration
between established economies and nongovernmental organizations first helping to
intervene, but working with the primary goal of creating innovation tailored to Kenya. As
such, change can succeed from primarily within. However, even when one factor in
cyclical poverty improves, there are constraints on those improvements when other

Asongu, “Mobile Phone Innovation and Technology-Driven Exports in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 2017.
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About
It (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
21
Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 12.
19
20
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factors, such as resources, political stability, health, education, social development, war,
and corruption, still prevail.22 While more traditional studies believe that responsible aid
can be a tool to help end certain development traps, modern studies have suggested that
African governments wean away from aid, invest in entrepreneurship, take risks in
foreign investment, and seek trade with emerging markets.23 Dambisa Moyo challenges
Collier’s argument, contending that ethnic ties are more integrated in Africa than in the
developed world, and certainly not the reason for all civil conflict and development.24
This thesis aims to expand and consider both perspectives on development theory.
This thesis will not look at individual household effects of mobile technology, but
rather examine the effect of various forms of technological development in Kenya. It will
use M-Pesa as a primary case study, but not as the only example of technological
innovation and change. In the absence of abundant literature, this study begins to directly
link M-Pesa and the decentralized banking system to individual and Kenyan economic
developments. It also aims to synthesize growth patterns, survey data and personal
attitudes to compare why innovation and entrepreneurship have been so successful in
Kenya but have had mixed results in other East African countries. Ultimately, technology
is not the solution to all factors of cyclical poverty, but it can create new approaches to
previously underserved constraints to development in Kenya and in other developing
countries hoping to emulate the process towards Kenya’s economic success.

22

Howard Handelman, The Challenge of Third World Development, 7th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2013).
Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa
(Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre, 2009).
24
Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, 33.
23
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II. The Cycle of Economic and Political Underdevelopment: Kenya as a Case Study
Development is multifaceted and complex. Until recently, the word itself was tied
to colonialism, with the western world pushing their norms onto other nations, exploiting
resources for colonizers’ benefits, and advancing state interests. However, when nations,
corporations, and non-governmental organizations are held accountable, development
goals can be achieved. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs…sustainable
development has emerged as the guiding principle for long-term global development.
Consisting of three pillars, sustainable development seeks to achieve, in a balanced
manner, economic development, social development and environmental protection.”25
For this thesis, development will be considered under the UNDP guidelines.
Understanding why some countries grow and develop faster than others varies
with a history of sociopolitical and economic factors, but many scholars agree that civil
conflict and political disorder undermine the potential for growth. Political development
“involves the creation of specialized and differentiated government institutions that
effectively carry out necessary functions, such as collecting tax revenues, defending
national borders, maintaining political stability, stimulating economic development,
improving the quality of human life, and communicating with the citizenry.”26 Some
developmental scholars believe that democracy is not essential to development, but that
governmental legitimacy typically aids political participation and other societal

General Assembly of the United Nations, “Sustainable Development,”
http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/issues/sustdev.shtml.
26
Handelman, The Challenge of Third World Development, 14.
25
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components, such as susceptibility to mass violence, insurrection, more investment and
economic growth, and freedom of the press to hold the government accountable.27 When
not present, socioeconomic growth may falter and societies may be prone to violence or
political unrest.28 For example, 73% of those in the bottom billion have recently been
through a civil conflict, or are currently in one.29
Since Kenya’s independence in 1963, several economic and sociopolitical
characteristics, like many African countries, made it prone to civil conflict. Collier links
three economic characteristics that make a country prone to civil war: low income, slow
growth, and dependence upon primary commodity exports.30 Kenya’s economy struggled
with varying degrees of these characteristics. The average yearly income in 2008 in
Kenya was 832.22 USD.31 According to the World Bank, this classifies Kenya as a lowincome economy, defined as, “those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World
Bank Atlas method, of $995 or less.”32 In 2006, approximately 39.9% of the country
lived under the international poverty standard of $2 a day.33 Approximately 53% of
Kenyans lived under national poverty criteria lines in the 2000s.34 Unemployment from
1997 until 2007 averaged about 10.8%.35

27

Handelman, The Challenge of Third World Development, 16.
Ibid.
29
Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 17.
30
Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 21.
31To see world bank calculations of GNI, see World Bank, “The World Bank Atlas Method : Detailed
Methodology,” World Bank Data, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378832what-is-the-world-bank-atlas-method.
32
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2007 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2008),
https://www.knbs.or.ke/download/economic-survey-2007-3/.
33
The World Bank, Poverty Data: A Supplement to World Development Indicators 2008, December 2008,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI08supplement1216.pdf.
34
Ibid.
35
World Bank, “Unemployment, Total,” The World Bank Data, last modified 2018,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS?locations=KE&year_low_desc=false.
28
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development describes primary
commodities as, “food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, excluding manufactured
goods; crude materials, inedible, excluding fuels, synthetic fibers, waste and scrap;
mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, excluding petroleum products; animal and
vegetable oils, fats and waxes.”36 When a country’s GDP consists mainly of primary
commodities, it can be considered dangerous as they are typically inelastic. While a price
difference of a few cents or dollars may not be noticeable to wholesale buyers or firstworld consumers, price fluctuations have a detrimental impact on those producing the
commodities. A few dollars in the lives of farmers can play a major role in their lives and
the lives of their families, especially in countries such as Kenya, where the economies of
rural populations rely almost entirely on agriculture. In Kenya, the share of agricultural
exports varied between 61.3% and 55.8% between 2000 and 2008.37 By 2008, the foodproduct share of Kenyan exports was 42.5%, leaving the overall share of Kenyan exports
highly inelastic and exposed to market volatilities.38 Overall, primary commodity
instability from 2000-2009 averaged at 26% globally and from 1980 until the 2000s, SubSaharan Africa’s world market share decreased from 3.5% to a stagnant 1.5% share.39
The United Nations Development Program has estimated that “of the roughly 2.5
billion people engaged in agriculture in developing countries, about 1 billion derive a
substantial part of their income from the exports of commodities…. Price fluctuations can

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms Primary Commodities Definition,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, last
modified August 26, 2004, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6181.
37
The World Trade Organization, “International Trade Statistics 2009” (World Trade Organization, 2009),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2009_e/its2009_e.pdf.
38
Ibid.
39
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ed., Economic Development in Africa: Trade
Performance and Commodity Dependence (New York: United Nations, 2003).
36
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have impact on aspects of everyday life, such as food, school fees and healthcare.”40 In
the long term, the effects are concerning because “increases in volumes must compensate
for drops in prices in order for an economy to be able to afford…. Dependence on
primary commodities heightens a country’s vulnerability because (non-oil) primary
commodity prices exhibit a largely declining trend.”41 This affects foreign investment,
debt, and sustainability of exports.
Beyond Collier’s economic characteristics, Kenya’s government faced other
domestic challenges, such as a lack of basic infrastructure, urban poverty, and disparity of
resources in rural areas. In 2004, only 14% of Kenya’s roads were paved.42 According to
a World Health Organization report, in Africa, “only 43 percent of urban dwellers had
access to piped water. Waste disposal presents a tremendous health hazard in many urban
areas; in Kibera, Nairobi’s largest slum, plastic bags are used as “flying toilets.” Indoor
air pollution, poor nutrition, and urban crime all pose threats to urban residents.”43 While
only 19% of Kenyans reported living in an urban area in 2007, 71% of Kenyans residing
in an urban area lived in “slum conditions.”44 In Sub-Saharan Africa, only 40% of urban
residents have access to sanitation.45

40

Commodity Dependence and International Commodity Prices, Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining
MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty (The United Nations Development Program, 2010).
41
Commodity Dependence and International Commodity Prices, 2010.
42
Ibid.
43
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “The Process of Urbanization in Africa (From the Origins to the
Beginning of Independence),” African Studies Review 34, no. 1 (1991): 1–98.
44
Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Kenya (Library of Congress Federal
Research Division, June 2007), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Kenya.pdf.
45
Jeremy Barofsky, Eyerusalem Siba, and Jonathan Grabinsky, “Can Rapid Urbanization in Africa Reduce
Poverty? Causes, Opportunities, and Policy Recommendations,” Brookings Institute, Africa in Focus,
September 7, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/09/07/can-rapid-urbanization-inafrica-reduce-poverty-causes-opportunities-and-policy-recommendations/.
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The United Nations contends that “the GDP of many Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
countries is concentrated, and even reliant, on the productivity of its urban centers. It is
rare to transition from a low-income country (LIC) to a middle-income country (MIC)
without first having to go through a process of urbanization. However, as it currently
stands, many urban areas in SSA are ill-equipped to mitigate the impending risks
associated with urbanization. Rapid population growth without improved infrastructure
and services can cause negative repercussions in SSA, and may have already done so.” 46
Furthermore, “the region continues to be plagued by negative per capita income growth,
weak investment, and a decline in productivity.”47 With evidence of slums, corruption,
and weak infrastructure, this was the case of Kenya’s urban centers in the late 2000s.
Additionally, the fertility rate in Africa is much higher in Africa than the rest of
the world, and is “40 percent higher than Latin America and 65 percent higher than
Asia.”48 This fertility rate has led to an extreme youth bulge in Kenya. Approximately
75% of Kenyans were under 30 in 2005.49 Between 2008 and 2012, 10.3% of children
were underweight in rural areas while only 2% were underweight in urban areas.50 For
children ages 6- 13, in urban areas, approximately 96% were in enrolled in primary

46

Mariama Awumbila, Drivers of Migration and Urbanization in Africa: Key Trends and Issues, United
Nations Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility, and International Migration (New
York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, September 2017),
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/expert/27/papers/III/paper-Awunbilafinal.pdf.
47
Mariama Awumbila, Drivers of Migration and Urbanization in Africa: Key Trends and Issues, United
Nations Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility, and International Migration (New
York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, September 2017),
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/expert/27/papers/III/paper-Awunbilafinal.pdf.
48
Ibid.
49
Youth Policy, “Kenya,” Youth Policy, last modified April 28, 2014,
http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/kenya/.
50
UNICEF, “Kenya: Statistics,” UNICEF, last modified December 27, 2013,
https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/kenya_statistics.html.
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school following the 2003 Kenyan agenda for free primary education. However, the
range of students from rural areas varied, with 23% enrolled in northeastern Kenya and
82% in western Kenya.51 When surveyed in 2008, 37.5% and 29% of Kenyans said their
current living situation was “very bad” or “bad,” respectively.52 52% felt their living
situation was worse compared to other ethnic groups. Only 44% of Kenyans had never
gone without food, 15% had never gone without a cash income, and 61% were without a
job or looking for a job. 53% of Kenyans agreed that the government’s economic policies
have hurt most people and benefitted a few.53 The disproportion of wealth and resources
caused unrest among many. From 2007 to 2011, the share of household from the poorest
40% was 14% of the national income, while for the richest 20% of Kenya, the share of
household income was 53%.
However, these deficiencies are not the only characteristic leading to civil
conflict. Corruption, lack of citizen participation, and lack of public trust also affect the
potential for upheaval. While 78% of Kenyans said democracy was the preferred form of
government in 2008, the absence of economic growth and political distrust led to
instability, as is apparent in Kenya’s attempt at democracy and the political and ethnic
violence re-erupting in 2007.54
On December 30, 2007, Kenya erupted into political violence following the
reelection of Mwai Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC), marginally

51

Demographic and Health Survey 2008-09 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, June 2010).
Afrobarometer, 2007.
53
Ibid.
54
Stefan Dercon and Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero, Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan
Electoral Violence (United Kingdom Department for International Development, 2010).
52
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beating former political ally, Ralia Odinga, at the polls. Kibaki was announced to have
received 4,584,721 votes while Odinga received 4,352,993, and claims of rigging began
immediately.55 As with several Sub-Saharan countries, such as Zimbabwe and Rwanda,
elections have historically depended on ethnic affiliations and agendas.56 Kenya has over
seventy ethnicities, with the largest groups being Kikuyu (20%), Luhya (14%), Luo
(13%), Kalenjin (11%) and Kamba (11%).57 Ethnic tensions had been present in both the
elections of 1992 (the first democratic elections in Kenya) and 1997, resulting in violence
towards the Kikuyus, who were the largest, and perceived to be the most powerful group
in Kenya. However, even with a massive lower class, the Kenyan elite has been
perceived as stronger than those of many other African countries, allowing for relatively
stable elections with multiparty participation. However, in 2008, the same pattern of
ethnic blame between Kibaki, a Kikuyu and Odinga, a Luo, resulted in massacre, with
approximately 1,133 deaths and over 350,000 displacements.58 One witness to a church
burning in Nairobi stated, “It reminds me of Rwanda.”59 For two months following the
election, “looting, arson, and property destruction were rampant.”60
Several global leaders, such as Chairman of the African Union John Kufuor,
former United Nations Secretary Generals Kofi Annan and Ban-Ki Moon, United States

“Kenya’s Dubious Election,” British Broadcast Channel, January 8, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7175694.stm.
56
Pascaline Dupas and Jonathan Robinson, “The (Hidden) Costs of Political Instability: Evidence from
Kenya’s 2007 Election Crisis,” Journal of Development Economics 99, no. 2 (November 2012): 314–329.
57
University of Pennsylvania, Kenya: Ethnic Groups, East Africa Living Encyclopedia (University of
Pennsylvania, n.d.), https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kethnic.htm.
58
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) (Nairobi: Republic of Kenya,
2008).
59
Jeffrey Gettleman, “Mob Sets Kenya Church on Fire, Killing Dozens,” The New York Times, January 2,
2008, sec. Africa, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/02/world/africa/02kenya.html.
60
Dupas and Robinson, “The (Hidden) Costs of Political Instability: Evidence from Kenya’s 2007 Election
Crisis,” 2012.
55
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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary General of the East African
Community Juma Mwapachu, intervened and successfully ended the insurrection on
February 28, 2008 with Odinga and Kibaki signing the National Accord and
Reconciliation Act.
However, the conflict had an effect on Kenya beyond its borders, damaging
Kenya’s already weak economy and infrastructure; the European Union, which had aided
in overseeing the elections, claimed in mid-January that “all political parties in Kenya
should recognize that it cannot be business as usual in Kenya until there is political
compromise which leads to a lasting solution that reflects the will of the Kenyan
people.”61 The United States echoed, with the leading head US diplomat to Africa, Jack
Frazer claiming, to be “deeply disappointed “ in Kibaki and Odinga’s failure to negotiate
peace, saying, “the United States cannot conduct business as usual in Kenya."62 Such
instability contributed to economic losses. At the beginning of 2008, the World Bank
estimated “declines in the agricultural, manufacturing, and services sectors” of the
Kenyan economy.63 They outlined the economic detriments of political instability, listing,
“The violent disruption to the free flow of goods, labor and money has affected all
sectors of the economy. While the situation is slowly returning to near-normality
in most places, many problems will take time to resolve since the period has
resulted in: (i) damage to physical assets, (ii) the displacement of about 300,000

“Pressure Mounts on Kenya’s Leaders - Breaking News - World - Breaking News,” The Sydney Morning
Herald (Sydney, March 14, 2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080314042916/http://news.smh.com.au/pressure-mounts-on-kenyasleaders/20080113-1lnb.html.
62
Ibid.
63
World Bank, Economic Impact of the Political Crisis in Kenya : 2008 and Beyond. (Washington, DC.:
World Bank, 2008), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/19523.
61
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people, about 1 percent of population; (iii) the loss of confidence among investors
and tourists and (iv) damage to social capital.”64
As estimated, Kenya’s economy suffered. In 2007, Kenya’s economy grew by 7.1%. In
2008, it grew by 1.7%, and in 2009, it was only projected to grow 2.5%.65 The annual
percentage of GDP dropped 0.232% in 2008.66 The rest of the world also suffered from
the 2008 financial crisis, but the Kenyan markets contracted beyond financial failure; the
banking and credit sector still grew by about 20% in 2009. However, in 2008, Kenyan
agriculture production fell by 5%, and in 2009, it was estimated to drop another 2.5%.67
Tourism fell 36%, and utilities contracted 9%.68 The unemployment rate skyrocketed and
hit a high in 2009, at approximately 12.3%.69 Following the crisis, “infrastructure
bottlenecks continue to negatively impact the economy, in particular the manufacturing
and agro-export sectors.”70 The road network in 2008 fell from 63,500 to about 61,500
paths across the country.71 Additionally, “The agriculture sector remain[ed] the Achilles’
heel of Kenya’s economy, both in terms of production and wealth distribution.”72 While
primary commodities were destroyed in the violence, a massive drought caused a food
crisis, with millions of crops withering, livestock dying, and the prices of maize, rice, and
wheat rising to a point of unaffordability for many Kenyan families. To worsen the food
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crisis, the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture was also accused of raising the prices of
imported maize. Kenya’s overall governance provoked international attention as it was
one of many accounts of the consequences of similar political fragility across Africa. The
importance of the instability revealed that:
“The importance of the Kenya crisis for the African continent is not that Kenya
may become ‘another Rwanda’, but that it reveals how fragile Africa's new multiparty systems may be when weak institutions, historical grievances, the
normalization of violence, and a lack of elite consensus on the ‘rules of the game’,
come together to form what Mwangi and Holmquist have called a ‘perfect storm’.
Significantly, many of Africa's other fragile democracies share some of Kenya's
most significant political characteristics. Salient ethno-regional identities
reinforced by historical grievances over land ownership, economic inequality, and
political exclusion, are central to an understanding of the Kenya crisis, and are
present in one form or another in countries as diverse as Namibia and Cote
d'Ivoire. At the same time, the spread of the violence in Kenya owed much to the
informalization of the state, the diffusion of violence beyond central control, and
the rise of militias connected to the political elite… Furthermore, the lure of the
imperial presidency, and the difficulty of achieving elite agreement on key
constitutional questions – which Chege has termed the ‘elusiveness of cohesion’ –
was a major contributor to the elite deadlock which followed the election, and is a
problem that has also bedevilled a number of other countries including Zambia
and Uganda. Finally, the difficulty of forming an effective coalition government
from a weak, fluid, and heavily divided party system, was an issue that bookended
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the Kenya crisis and has also hampered effective governance in Benin and
Malawi.”73
The violence and dissatisfaction with ethnic politics, poor economics, and corruption
were not unusual for a developing country. Institutions were weak, infrastructure was
destroyed, economic markets had contracted, and political distrust was high. When
surveyed, 54% of Kenyans felt completely free, but 39% were afraid of becoming a
victim of political violence or intimidation and 32% felt they must always be careful of
what they said about politics.74 At the time, many called for a change throughout the
continent, saying, “African governments and city officials need to step up to the
plate…They need to articulate that there are problems.”75 When asked in the 2008
Afrobarometer survey, Kenyan’s displeasure was evident. 54% said that the government
was “very bad” or “bad at allowing for civic participation, 61% said the government was
“very bad” or “bad” at keeping local communities clean, 63% said local government was
“very bad” or “bad” at regulating markets, and 77.3% said the government was “very
bad” or “bad” at maintaining and creating roads.76
However, unlike similar crises in Rwanda and Malawi, the Kenyan government
recognized the negative impact of losing foreign investment and aid, as well as the
economic and sociopolitical losses caused by both the political crisis and global
economic crisis. Concerns had been raised from the European Union (which was Africa’s
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largest trading partner with 26% of trade), United States (Africa’s second largest trade
partner, with 18% of all trade), and the African Union, all major security and economic
partners for Kenya. 77 Kibaki’s incumbent reelection had been criticized by some as an
“incumbent dictatorship.”78 It led to an International Criminal Court case that convicted
six of the members most responsible for the violence, and his election, like most of the
Kenyan elections, was by no means focused on a humanitarian or ethical purpose.
However, in the months following his reelection, Kibaki placed an importance on Agenda
Item 4 of the coalition agreement, which addresses the need for serious economic reforms
that “could leave to a recurrence of violence if left unaddressed.”79 With this, Kibaki’s
acknowledgement for neoliberal economic reforms allowed for the first step in the
growth of the lacking private sector.
The 2007-2008 Kenyan conflict is important to both technological investment and
development as the Kenyan government attempted to jumpstart political initiatives and
investment, consequentially making the atmosphere one of opportunity rather than
absolute destruction. Within the first year of reelection, the government reaffirmed the
Kenya Vision 2030 (originally drafted in 2006), The Constituency Development Fund
(launched in 2003), and launched the Kenya Transition Initiative following the signing of
the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement. USAID aided in the Kenya
Transition Initiative “to support national and local-level stabilization and transition
efforts targeted at recovery and reducing political and social volatility and vulnerability to
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violence.”80 In May 2008, the government aimed to address the youth bulge in the
country, converting departments to create the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports.81
While initiatives alone did not create change, the post-election government called for
economic change, remaining open to entrepreneurship, investment, and foreign support.82
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III. The Rise of Technology, Entrepreneurship, and M-Pesa
Technology has been described as “a key that unlocks long term prosperity, or a
curse that deepens inequalities, depending on the policy responses we choose”83
Technology does not only open the doors to trade (and e-trade), but allows for another
channel of accountability through social media, messaging platforms, and cellular
communication. For example, Twitter feeds and YouTube videos raised global
awareness in the Arab Spring uprisings, calling attention to mass conflict in 2010. On the
other hand, the Islamic State is known to use recruitment methods via Facebook and
Twitter. With access to cell phones and further forms of technology, people are given the
chance to educate themselves, witness events, and communicate with others. In
technologically developed areas, artificial intelligence is aiding in security and defense
policies, providing aid to those with disability, and automating exponentially more jobs.
Achim Steiner, a United Nations Development Program administrator, describes the
consequences:
“There is no doubt that technology presents unprecedented opportunities to tackle
some of the world’s most challenging development problems: artificial intelligence
supporting better diagnostics in health care, satellite imagery helping to combat
deforestation and drones being used to map areas at risk of disasters…But
technological innovation will not automatically lead to prosperity and sustainability in
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every country and every society. The digital revolution requires new and inclusive
policy responses if it is to benefit everyone.”84

How then, can technology be utilized in developing countries to keep up with the modern
technological revolution while also aiding in basic development needs? In the developing
world, over one billion people live without access to any form of electricity.85 Artificial
intelligence and social media cannot begin to be a concern without accessibility to basic
needs, such as electricity, cooking fuel, and clean water. In Kenya, only 24% of the
population had electricity in 2007.86 In 2000, 0.4 per one hundred people had mobile
cellular subscriptions.87 However, with missions of inclusivity and personalized
technological solutions, Kenya’s technology market has provided financial accessibility
to almost 20 million Kenyans in the past decade (of approximately the amount of 44
million Kenyans overall) and expanded mobile access to 93% of the population.88 One of
the integral solutions came from the SMS-based remittance application, M-Pesa.
M-Pesa, which means “mobile money” in Swahili, had its informal launch in
April 2007, before the Kenyan economic crisis and political uproar. However, in the
eleven years since its inception, it has provided economic freedom and opportunities to
the most poverty-stricken areas, allowed for business and entrepreneurial growth, and
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aided in agricultural and energy technology, which is still crucial for the largely
commodity-driven economy. According to Safaricom, the leading telecommunication
provider in Kenya and a 40% stakeholder in M-Pesa, the intention of M-Pesa was to
provide an easy, reliable solution to the several underlying issues in Kenya. In their first
launch, they claimed, “M-Pesa is aimed at mobile customers who do not have a bank
account, typically because they do not have access to a bank or because they do not have
sufficient income to justify a bank account. All they need to do is register at an
authorized M-Pesa Agent by providing their Safaricom mobile number and their
identification card.”89 Once authorized, initial M-Pesa users could add money to their
account through cash deposits at agencies, send money via short messaging service
(SMS) even if the receiving end was not an M-Pesa or Safaricom user, withdraw cash at
agencies, and use M-Pesa to buy cellular credit for themselves and others. When first
launched, there were 750 agencies at local, reliable points of access, such as grocery
stands, Safaricom storefronts, and gas stations.
The initial launch had several reasons for success: first, the lack of government
accountability and distrust in institutions provided a market for entrepreneurship and
accountability in Kenyan society. In 2007, Kenya was ranked 150th out of 180 for global
corruption.90 Overall satisfaction with local and national government, accountability, and
democratic freedom was low.91 Therefore, when a major mobile provider in Kenya and
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subsidiary of Vodafone, Safaricom, put 40% ownership into M-Pesa and used its
established domestic presence to build a repertoire with new customers, name recognition
established initial trust with the new application. Furthermore, M-Pesa was never a bank
account, but rather described as mobile money. The largely unbanked population did not
need a bank account for M-Pesa, but rather a cell phone.
Many young Kenyans, especially due to Kenya’s youth bulge, migrated to the
expanding cities of Nairobi and Mombasa to find employment opportunities. Intraregional migration is 67% higher than the rest of the world.92 Because of Kenya’s
undergoing of “rapid urbanization, far more quickly than many other African countries,”
it has become the norm for “families to split, with parents retired in cheaper rural areas
and sons and daughters living and working in urban centers. With an under developed
pension infrastructure most families support their older relatives. This they do by sending
money home, often through a monthly transfer.”93 Sending money home would require
significant time to travel to and from their city of employment back to their rural
hometowns or resources to transfer cash. However, many were forced to remain in the
city with little opportunity to travel home, as “there are few opportunities for formal
employment outside of the cities, as the government has emphasized the development of
the urban economy over the rural. Wages also tend to be significantly higher in the urban
areas, due to union representation and collective bargaining agreements.”94 Furthermore,
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“in Nairobi, the average journey-to-work time is one of the longest…Part of the reason is
that walking accounts for a large share of commuting — in Nairobi about 41 percent. But
even if more city dwellers could afford transport by car or minibus, commutes would
remain impractical for lack of roads.”95 M-Pesa addressed this market frustration by
aiming their first services in areas with high needs for remittance. They marketed
themselves with the slogan “send money home.” This resonated especially with the 42%
of the Kenyan population between fifteen and thirty, many of them working in Nairobi to
send money back to their rural hometowns. Transporting cash bears safety risks,
transportation issues, and time concerns, but when used properly, mobile monetization
became more safe and secure.
Additionally, because institutions are fragile and therefore do not offer the
employment and financial protections desired in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, a massively
expanding informal economy emerged in Kenya and Sub-Saharan Africa overall. The
International Labor Organization fully recognizes the existence of informal economies in
many developing countries, claiming that: “In some countries, the term “informal
economy” refers to the private sector. In some other countries, the term is considered
synonymous with the “underground”, “shadow” or “grey” economy. However, the
majority of workers and enterprises in the informal economy produce legal goods and
services, albeit sometimes not in conformity with procedural legal requirements, for
example where there is non-compliance with registration requirements or immigration
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formalities.”96 In Sub-Saharan Africa, this aversion to the traditional market began to
appear especially in early 2000, when, “the informal economy accounted for 43.2 percent
of gross national production for Sub-Saharan Africa in 1999-2000 and 81 percent of
those employed in the informal economy in SSA (excluding South Africa) [were] selfemployed.”97 The informal sector is especially important for women hoping to work.
According to one World Bank study, “the proportion of the female non-agricultural labor
force that works in the informal sector is more than 95 percent in Benin, Chad and Mali,
and more than 80 percent in Guinea and Kenya.”98 However, without certain safeguards,
the informal economies are not optimized for information, costs, and prices. Economist
Jenny Aker argues that:
“In developing countries, informal networks provide important means by which
households and individuals share information on a variety of topics, although the
costs of searching for this information are often high. Economists and
policymakers alike have proposed a number of reasons for this costly search,
including limited transport and telecommunications infrastructure. These costs
make it difficult for households and individuals to engage in optimal arbitrage,
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resulting in excess price dispersion and potentially lower prices (for farmers) and
higher prices (for consumers).”99
As such, in agricultural societies like Kenya, the need for mobile technology was
present in both the formal and informal economies, and the government was doing little
for improvement on its own. Especially in the initial launch, when only 12% of Kenyans
had a formal bank account, M-Pesa could be easily utilized as a tool in the informal
economy, since the only “paperwork” needed was a Safaricom subscription and a
government identification card. Whereas many formal financial institutions and World
Bank projects require more paperwork such as official business registration, documents,
and proof of sales, M-Pesa functioned more similarly as a “cellular” Western Union,
providing cellular remittance. For example, one user who worked in the informal
construction economy, recalled: “"I work in construction but I don't work under any
contractor I just work on local constructions around my neighborhood…I use M-Pesa to
mostly pay the people we work together with. I just request the owner of the project to
send me the money in my M-Pesa and I pay the others from there.”100
While M-Pesa itself grew out of Kenya’s largely duopolistic telecommunication
service, the founders were able to understand Kenyan’s frustrations with the corruption of
government and local businesses taking advantage of many without financial literacy. In
July 2009, M-Pesa required that users register all M-Pesa SIM cards to avoid the
potential for fraud. Within a year, M-Pesa’s users jumped from 8 million to 14 million
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and the number of agents almost doubled from approximately 15,000 to over 30,000
locations.101 With safety and security measures, M-Pesa and Safaricom built an
established, reliable network that many public institutions could not offer.
Second, M-PESA was built as a collaboration. Players included the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Vodafone’s subsidiary
Safaricom, the Central Bank of Kenya, and Kenyan microfinance nonprofit, Fault Kenya.
In recent years, such pilot programs have become less atypical in developing countries.
When working with large, corporate telecommunication providers, the capacity to
innovate without collaboration can be limited, as many corporations of developing
countries are operating on lower profits with low-margin customers. However, while forprofit organizations aim for economic success, their products can still provide solutions
and investment in local and developing economies, especially through crosscollaboration. Each partner offered resources and knowledge with different goals, but
aimed to collaborate to create part of a modern, successful solution to poverty reduction.
The United Kingdom Department for International Development Fund pledged to help
achieve the eight Millennium Development Goals, a United Nation’s mission aim at
reducing poverty by 50% before 2015.102 As such, the DFID hoped to provide
international development aid through £15 million available for “joint investments with
the private sector on projects that help improve access to financial services,” but did not
have the local repertoire of nonprofits and organizations to best execute poverty
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reduction. 103 As a for-profit, Vodafone was limited to make decisions which promised
the best return on investment for shareholders.104 Local nonprofits and microfinance
institutions had cultural and local knowledge, but lacked resources to create significant
change. Therefore, collaboration between for-profits, nonprofits and government
agencies was mutually beneficial.
This initial funding for the M-Pesa project stemmed in 2003, when Nick Hughes,
Head of Global Payments for Vodafone, approached the Department for International
Development Fund at the World Summit for Sustainable Development and discussed
grant opportunities for the development of a financial access tool in Kenya. When
granted, his ideas were thus shaped to best fit the target consumers with the help of
information-sharing across the public and private sectors. Additionally, the DIFD
recognized the gap of knowledge and financial data, and provided funding to local
organizations and Kenyan banks to help implement the original 2006 FinAccess survey,
which “showed very low levels of bank penetration in Kenya.” This also alarmed the
Central Bank of Kenya, which in turn employed their Payments System Group “to
explore all reasonable options for correcting the financial access imbalance.”105 As such,
the Central Bank of Kenya also became interested in the initial M-Pesa solution.
When drafting original ideas for the tool, the initial plan was to “provide a method
via mobile phones for lenders to distribute their loans and for lendees to send payments
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back to the lenders.”106 It was intended to be simple, PIN-protected, and low-cost.107 The
DIFD first pictured a microfinancing tool. While microfinance institutions have gained
notoriety in the developed world for providing funding, resources, and knowledge, the
reality is less impactful than most think; “the mean for all SSA countries [that use
microfinance institutions as a means of investment] is a meager 4.3 percent.”108 However,
Faulu Kenya, a local microfinance institution, could provide real customers that
Vodafone could work with to understand Kenyan customers, frictions, and market needs.
What they discovered was that “the normal process for doing [cash transactions are] to
form groups of about 20 people who meet each week and submit cash to the group
treasurer. He in turn takes the money to a local bank, accompanied by a suitable
bodyguard of group members. This may involve a long bus journey to the nearest bank.
The weekly loan repayment ritual is time-consuming, costly, and keeps people away from
their businesses.”109 However, when using Faulu customers to run their first trials, MPesa capped users to 1000 participants and confirmed “customers want
speed/convenience, security, and lower costs of money transfer.”110 In the initial six week
run, the microfinance group Faulu had 57 transactions.111 The total transactions for Faulu
in Kenyan shillings (KSH) were 1,216,000, but overall, 7.5 million KSH were done in
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transactions.112 The trial run and pilots confirmed that when seen as solely a microfinance
tool, M-Pesa would fail. However, this insight allowed for iterations of the product that
better resolved consumer needs.
Especially during its launch throughout a time of political tension, proving
collaborative partnerships to end corruptive practices was key. These transparent
collaborations were initiated to foster trust among the target user base. Initially, the
Central Bank of Kenya delayed regulatory positions that would hinder M-Pesa’s ability to
launch. The Central Bank conducted due diligence and risk mitigation assessments, but
took the legal position that M-Pesa was not a bank and therefore would not be regulated
the same as banking institutions. This was stated in the Letter of No Objection issued by
the Central Bank of Kenya to Safaricom.113 In their observations of mobile money, the
International Telecommunications Union stressed that “the role of the Central Bank of
Kenya in creating an enabling regulatory environment for mobile money cannot be
overstated…Kenya’s central bank has managed to encourage innovation and growth
while preserving the stability and soundness of the financial sector.”114 Additionally, “in
late 2008, following a lobbying effort by the banking industry to shut down [M-Pesa], the
Central Bank of Kenya performed an audit of the M-Pesa service at the request of the
Ministry of Finance and declared it safe and in line with the country’s objectives for
financial inclusion. Thus far, the Central Bank appears justified in its confidence in M-
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Pesa—there have been no reports of major fraud. Although system downtime remains
frequent, it has not been catastrophic.”115
As mobile money became the most prevalent financial option in Kenya, regulators
issued the National Payment Systems Act in 2011 and extended regulation in 2014. The
guidelines led to a significant increase in service providers as the bank established itself
as the main regulator of mobile money. Therefore, companies that planned to sell shares
through public placements would also require a letter of no objection or license, the same
process in which M-Pesa was given the approval to operate. Additionally, guidelines
added included provisions such that electronic payments must be conducted in real time,
and if it is delayed, providers must communicate with the customer immediately,
advertisements must be “easily understood” and cannot be misleading in any way, and
interoperability must be through “clear, fair and non-discriminatory access
procedures.”116 These guidelines established trust for domestic consumers and agents, as
well as foreign investors. While trust in a single institution may be imperfect, with
backing from players across the public and private fields, M-Pesa could establish
consumer trust by displaying accountability across several sectors.
Third, M-Pesa was launched in an iterative pilot mode, to be tested and changed
upon to best understand consumer needs. Within the first years of launching, M-Pesa was
able to capture the needs of the intended market, the unbanked, because of testing with
Faulu, but understood that customers with low income would not be the initial customers
in the 2007 launch. As such, they aimed their product at the 10% of Kenyans earning
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more than 23 times more than the bottom 10% of the population.117 As described, “MPesa’s early adopters were primarily banked customers, suggesting that M-Pesa did not
acquire its initial critical mass through competition with the formal sector but rather as a
complement to formal services for clients who were wealthier, more exposed to formal
financial service options, and less risk averse.” 118
Additionally, at launch, “the average M-Pesa user [was] twice as likely to have a
bank account (72 percent versus 36 percent) and [was] wealthier (65 percent higher
expenditure levels), more literate, and better educated.”119 Users “also appear[ed] to be
experienced with banking services and fairly savvy with technology, which probably
makes them more keenly aware of the convenience of M-Pesa relative to alternative
financial services.”120 This was widely due to intense marketing investment, with,
“television and radio marketing, but there was also intense outreach through road shows,
in which company agents traveled around the country signing people up, explaining the
product, and demonstrating how to use it. Over time…television and radio marketing was
largely replaced by the omnipresent M-Pesa branding at all outlets, supported by a few
large billboards. Newer ads feature a general emotional appeal, with a wider range of
services indicated.”121 This marketing strategy was a concerted effort to “move from
young, up-market urban dwellers with desk jobs to more ordinary Kenyans with lowerpaid professions.”122 To prove its initial market viability, M-Pesa needed to prove
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profitability and desirability with a more influential user base. However, after displaying
measurable desirability, the company was able to strive towards its goal of increased
financial inclusion. The company continues to make its product more accessible through
agencies in rural areas and slums and decreased costs. For example, “in late 2016
Safaricom removed fees for transactions under KSH 100 with a view to driving uptake
among the cost-conscious. The response was swift – low-level transactions jumped from
1% of the total volume to nearly 11% by the end of 2017.”123
When first tested, the pilot was capped at 1,000 users. However, “within just two
weeks of the [soft] launch [in 2007] over 10,000 account holders were registered and
more than US$100,000 had been transferred.”124 Michael Joseph, CEO of Safaricom,
said: “Safaricom and Vodafone’s M-Pesa mobile money transfer service is an example of
Kenya leading the way in the advancement of mobile technology and its uses. Following
the very positive response by consumers to the pilot, we believe that there is a great deal
to be gained for Kenyan consumers as well as for mobile and financial sector
companies.”125 With this in mind, the company changed their product to satisfy consumer
needs through several product iterations.
M-Pesa also iterated on more significant security measures once the product
gained traction. For example, as M-Pesa has gotten more reliable and trustworthy, the
maximum limits of money have changed. At first, transactions were capped at a $1,400
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balance. 126 However, M-Pesa’s advantage at is launch was that “Safaricom was able to
design the M-Pesa service without having to contort its business model to fit within a
prescribed regulatory model.”127 The Central Bank of Kenya has continued to support MPesa’s development, even in the face of pressure from banks. Additionally, as a mobilemoney service, M-Pesa users receive SMS confirmation of transactions to provide
transparency as quickly as possible. Additionally, the transaction is secured and
customer-assured through multiple steps:
“Safaricom requires its outlets to record all cash-in/cash-out transactions in a
paper-based, Safaricom-created logbook. For each transaction, the store clerk
enters the M-Pesa balance, the date, agent ID, transaction ID, transaction type
(customer deposit or withdrawal), value, customer phone number, customer name,
and the customer’s national ID number. Customers are then asked to sign the log
for each transaction, which not only discourages fraud but also gives agents a way
to offer first-line customer care for customers querying previous transactions.
Each entry in the log is written in triplicate. The top copy is kept by the retail
outlet for its own records, a second is passed on to the store’s master agent, and
the third is sent to Safaricom. Because all information contained in the logbook
(except for the customer signature) is captured electronically by Safaricom when
the transaction is made and is available to the master agents through a Web
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management system, the main purpose of the agent log is not for record-keeping
but rather to provide comfort to customers.”128
With such a system, each step allows for security measures to be ensured and for
consumers to trust the process. Furthermore, while M-Pesa payments currently “represent
70% of all money moving around the system, they only account for about 2% of all
transactions, so don’t pose much risk for the economy.”129
In late 2008, M-Pesa recognized that many customers in the informal market used
M-Pesa to pay employees, to purchase materials, and to repay debts. While users found
creative ways to use the application, sending money home was still the most important
use. Since its introduction, “the number of Kenyan households receiving money transfers
increased from 17 percent to 52 percent.”130 With this insight, M-Pesa launched their Bill
Pay feature, with 350 businesses accepting payment via M-Pesa. Companies included
Family Bank and Bank of Kenya for loan repayments, and energy company Kenya
Power, where approximately 20% of its customers pay via M-Pesa. In the past year,
major international companies such as Google began to accept M-Pesa payments.131 With
increased security measures and the Central Bank of Kenya audit, both customers and
agencies grew. For business-to-business transactions (B2B), Safaricom has launched new
application programming interfaces (APIS) after recognizing common user interface
problems such as “massive reversal requests” to improve the existing customer
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experience.132These services include the automated payment and receipt processing,
which allows businesses to confirm or deny payment. Additional features built include
automated payment disbursements and automated payment reversals.133 The constant
iterations of the product allow for it to shift to the economy and individual consumer’s
needs as both Kenya develops and as individuals gain personal economic opportunities.
Overall, M-Pesa addressed an unmet need for a large percentage Kenyans and
launched when it was most needed. Whether this was largely predicted or completely
random, allowing transparent and accessible transactions is extremely important in
financial development and technology worldwide, and can be largely tailored to the
population. M-Pesa addressed the unmet need for non-corrupt transactions during a
period when Kenyan government institutions were held unaccountable. Even more
pressing was the country’s youth bulge, where mass amounts of young Kenyans moved
from home to find work. Until M-Pesa, money transfers needed to be done through
physical transportation or through unreliable remittance applications.134 Therefore, MPesa’s targeted marketing message of “send money home” rang true with approximately
20 million Kenyans. By identifying a tangible issue and creating a customized solution
for Kenyans, M-Pesa has had a significant change in Kenyans’ daily life and a larger
impact on the country’s development.
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IV. Improvements in Kenya
Per the Communications Authority of Kenya, in 2016, there were a total of
31,996,912 mobile money subscribers in Kenya.135 Other mobile money services also
began to enter the market; Airtel has 6 million users, Equitel has 1.2 million users,
Mobikash has 1.7 million users, Tangaza has 503,550 users, and Orange has 194,000
users. However, with approximately 20 million users, M-Pesa dominates the Kenyan
market.136 Currently, the initial 750 agencies have grown to 287,400 M-Pesa global
agencies.137 In the past year, there were 529 transactions per second, resulting in 614
million individual transactions through the M-Pesa interface.138 Additionally, distances to
agencies have been significantly reduced, even within rural regions; “When it was
launched the average distance to the nearest bank was 9.2 kilometers. Eight years later in
2015, the average distance to the nearest M-Pesa agent was a mere 1.4km.139 Local
economies grew and individual households could begin to save personal funds as a result
of the elimination of distance as a transactional and financial problem. By 2012, 32% of
M-Pesa users were expected to have grown from having no savings to some savings.140
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Anecdotally, many Kenyans have shared personal successes from their M-Pesa
subscription. One user stated, "in 2008, I was getting only four liters of milk a day.
Today, I get an average of seventeen liters of milk and this has helped educate my
children.”141 While this may not be statistically significant, individual lives have
benefitted and can attest to the benefits of using mobile money. However, a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology study discovered that by 2015, there were
correlated negative expenditure shocks on non-M-Pesa users in Kenya; M-Pesa users had
an approximate 11.8% increase in total expenditure consumption, while non-users
experienced a -2.7% shock. M-Pesa users had a 4.6% increase in household consumption
per capita, while non-users had a -7.4% decrease in household consumption.142
Furthermore, women’s opportunities and savings have had significant positive
correlation with mobile access and mobile money. Poverty among female-headed
households dropped approximately two percentage points by 2015.143 Female-headed
households that used M-Pesa had a 22% increase in savings.144 By 2016, “mobile-money
services have helped an estimated 185,000 women move from farming to business
occupations.”145 Women’s opportunity and technological access to shift sectors is
especially important as commodity-based economies, such as Kenya, develop. A
housekeeper in Mlolongo described, “Five years ago, there was no business in Mlolongo
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and I was jobless. I now have a job and I can feed my family. With the highway, there
many customers travelling, eating, lodging, I feel very safe. I am happy because my
family is stable, I even brought my children from the village to stay with me. I am able to
pay school fees for them and also pay house rent.”146 As developing countries typically
struggle by implementing either gender-neutral or gender-limiting policies, attention to
women’s equity and financial opportunity raises the living standards for both genders.147
Today, about 93% of the Kenyan population owns a mobile phone, almost double
that of five years ago, even though only 7 million Kenyans have access to bank
accounts.148 The drive for internet has also aided in the production needs for electricity
production; In 2008, electricity production was at 500 giga watts an hour. By the end of
2018, electricity production is predicted to go beyond 1000 giga watts an hour.149 The
growth in mobile money users has led to increased development, individual fiscal
freedom, and opportunities for groups such as women and those in rural areas.
Furthermore, the individual growth and increased access to economic opportunity has
allowed for the country to further develop. Since 2014, Kenya has grown to be classified
as a “lower-middle income country.”150 According to the World Bank, countries in this
category have a GNI per capita of “more than $1,046 (Sh99,024) but less $4,125
(Sh390,513). Those in the upper middle-income have yearly income levels of $4,126 to
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$12,735.”151 While only a few places higher than 2007, Kenya was ranked 143 on the
corruption index.152
Additionally, the results of the 2016 Afrobarometer survey reveals that mobile
technology has skyrocketed, yet infrastructural development unrelated to mobile still lags
in Kenya. In comparison to the Afrobarometer survey in 2007 where 58% of Kenyans
had an electricity grid in their area, 75% Kenyans reported an electric grid present in their
area in 2016.153 Additionally, in 2016, 41% had piped water, and 21% had a sewage
system, but 99% had cell phone service.154 84% did not have a post office within their
area, 95% had a school present in their area, and 59% did not have a police station.
77.7% did not have a bank in their region.155 Approximately 15% of roads were reported
as paved; when asked their last journey, 65.2% of respondents called road conditions
below or at fair standards.156
When asked specifically about their technology usage, 88% of Kenyans do not
own a computer and 67% and 69% never get their news from the internet or from social
media, respectively. 157 Furthermore, 40% of Kenyans were unsure if their phone even
had access to internet, and 59% reported never using the internet. However, 84% reported
that they use a mobile phone every day. 158 This is important when considering
government and private investment in infrastructural projects throughout the country, as
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55% of Kenyans still believe that the government is handling the economy poorly, and
63.8% believe the standards for the poor are poorly met. 76.2% of Kenyans still fear
political intimidation or violence, which is higher than the percentage reported in the
2007 surveys. While basic developmental necessities, government institutions and trust
may still be weak, telecommunication, energy, and economic outputs have significantly
improved.
While cell phone access is everywhere, basic sewage systems still lack and 15%
and 25% reported that their living situation is “very bad” and “fairly bad,” respectively.
These statistics are an improvement from the 2007 data, but it can be interpreted that both
private investment and the government may be producing a disparity between basic needs
and the desire to keep up with technology. While for-profits will invest in projects that
will result in economic output, they may be more hesitant to fund projects with less direct
effects. However, at some point, lack of infrastructure will also impede technological
development; if basic human needs are not being met, such as healthcare, food, and
safety, economic productivity will also falter.
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V. Additional Technology Developments in Eastern Africa
While M-Pesa’s success is championed throughout development and technology
communities in Eastern Africa, it is not the only technology platform to have caused
impact in the region and in individuals lives. Entrepreneurship in Nairobi has skyrocketed
in the last decade, gaining the nickname “Silicon Savannah.” Kenya currently has the
fourteenth fastest data connection speed in the world, 13.7 megabits per second (mbps),
which is a significant result of its heavy investment and reliance on technology across
sectors.159 This is the fastest and most accessible in Africa, and double the speed of the
United States, which ranked twenty-eighth at 10.7 mbps.160 As such, other, non-SMS
based programs have also led to Kenya’s increase in electricity, access to technology, and
economic output.
In 2010, the first formal innovation space, iHub, opened in Nairobi. Major
technology companies invested in or provided human capital support to iHub, including
Facebook, Oracle, Google, Fireside Group, IBM, Seacom, the leading East African home
entertainment provider, Wanachi, and M-Pesa’s parent company, Safaricom. The original
iHub funding also started with support from the World Bank, the since-ended
development fund, Making All Voices Count, and African water-solution nonprofit, Via
Water.161 Together, these major institutions, companies, and nonprofits could collaborate
and provide guidance in three separate areas of the startup process: entrepreneurship,
innovation, and investment.
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The iHub “aims to become the best African support system for ICT [information
and communication technology] focused tech entrepreneurs and individuals who aspire to
create great companies that tackle some of our biggest challenges. We will create an
environment of trust and experimentation that will be focused on the idiosyncrasies of
our local ecosystem in Kenya at first, but will venture out across the continent and
beyond.”162 Understanding common issues in Kenya, such as lack of loans or business
funding available to entrepreneurs, the iHub offers building hours 24/7 and subsidized
rates for those seeking to utilize the space.
Additionally, with support from the Africa Innovation Fund, the iHub can provide
investment to startups needing initial capital and resources. Just as startups would pitch to
investors, iHub offers an opportunity to pitch to the Africa Innovation Fund to create
sustainable business opportunities rather than aid. Since 2016, the iHub has worked to
wean away from all corporate aid, with a goal of becoming entirely self-funded because
of African investors. Instead of reliance on aid, iHub invites companies to lead
innovation, entrepreneurial, and investment sessions in their specialties. Massive
technology companies utilized by developed nations have hosted events to bring the same
technologies to Kenya. For example, Atlassian, the major Australian enterprise software
company, hosted an event on November 18, 2018, to discuss platforms such as Jira,
Trello, and OpsGenie, all products used by much of Silicon Valley. On November 26,
2018, Google held a user experience master class for startup founders and designers.
iHub can host approximately 20 similar events per month. iHub’s specific emphasis on
understanding Kenyan idiosyncrasies has been successful, as startups addressing Kenyan
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needs have seen major success. 170 startups have been founded, 12 entrepreneurs have
bought space within the 23,000-square footage of the iHub, and the iHub network has
expanded to over 16,000 members.163 Startups linked and hiring through the iHub include
Sheriasoft, Mwalimuplus, and Soko.
Sheriasoft is a Kenyan software company for iOS, Android, PC and Mac users,
providing a platform for lawyers to “manage tasks, matters, clients, billing, documents,
appointments, and reporting” with “bank-grade encryption and security audits.”164 After
going through the iHub-supported, 6 month, “traction camp,” Sheriasoft was able to
create a scalable business model and develop human capital for their platform.
Recognizing the need for disruption technology in the legal field, the platform provides
the tools necessary for a firm to be remotely run and eliminates the need for
transportation or heightened security for physical documents. The platform exponentially
grew from its founding in 2013, and was most recently commissioned by the Law Society
of Kenya for “the management of observer information during Kenya’s General Elections
held on August 8, 2017.”165 In response to previous government scandals, technology
was utilized to address concerns about government transparency and election corruption.
The August 2017 election was similar to the 2007 election; the race was filled with
accounts of corruption, tampering, and human rights violations; at least 45 people were
killed because of excessive police brutality.166 This led to calls for a reelection in October
2017. However, in contrast with the 2007 elections, technology programs could hold the
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government and local authorities more accountable with less risk to citizen
whistleblowers. With the Sheriasoft program, the Law Society of Kenya could receive
reports on the observation missions, information regarding elections, and the voting
process itself. This technology protected those who reported incidents or observations as
previous observers had violence incited against them.167 Overall, the Sheriasoft platform
allowed for transportation and security costs to be reduced, and for increased government
accountability in elections.
Founded in 2016, Mwalimuplus is an online e-learning platform tailored to the
Kenyan curriculum. It describes its system as “designed to improve the learning-teaching
process and has a significant amount of learning materials and supports for students to be
able to solve math questions with no help. Mwalimuplus provides learning materials in
form of questions to solve, worked-out examples and videos…. The system evaluates and
measures students understanding about different concepts in math and adapts the learning
materials to students’ needs.”168 While Kenya’s population enrolled in primary schools is
high for Sub-Saharan Africa, with a gross enrollment percentage of 105.31% in 2016, the
demand for teachers, especially in rural areas, is rarely met.169 As of April 2018, the
Kenyan Treasury has most recently “not released funds required to hire 20,000 teachers
annually and close a deficit of 155,605 [teachers].”170 Therefore, applications such as
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Mwalimuplus, which works to provide tutoring directly linked to the Kenyan curriculum,
can help fill an education gap that would not otherwise be addressed through the
government.
Soko, a Kenyan-handcrafted fashion jewelry brand using tribal designs,
recognized that artisan crafts were usually limited to local economies because of lack of
infrastructure. To address this issue, Soko’s supply chain was linked via mobile phone.
With the Soko platform, artisans are enabled to have a “virtual factory” instead of having
to spend time and resources for transportation or for the tools for thousands to work in a
warehouse. Instead, over 1,300 independent workers can use the Soko application to
“receive purchase orders, manage delivery and inventory, get paid directly, match artisan
capacity with real-time demand.” 171 Soko workers are able to avoid arbitrage through the
application, which provides pricing, quantity, and volumes so that artisans can “compete
with the mainstream consumer market.”172 Soko artisans have generated five times the
income of a typical artisan, generating over $1 million in revenue in 2016. Soko’s local,
solution-based supply chain was so profitable that in 2015, they established a second
headquarters in San Francisco, allowing for major fashion brands such as Nordstrom to
become Soko carriers. Similar to other startup successes from Kenya, by addressing a
specific need, Soko could both help in economic development while making more than a
marginal profit on their service.
Following the Nairobi iHub success, innovation spaces have started in almost all
major Kenyan areas, including Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, Voi, Machakos, and Nyeri.
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Startups with tailored solutions have experienced major successes as the technology
space was less regulated until the last decade. In addition to archetypical startups, M-Pesa
has launched several supplementary platforms, all of which compete with other startups
more so than M-Pesa itself, to address specific Kenyan needs. These include M-Shwari,
M-Kopa, and M-Farming.
M-Shwari was M-Pesa’s response to the lack of Kenyans with a bank account.
While M-Pesa has approximately 20 million users, only 7 million Kenyans currently have
bank accounts.173 M-Shwari was created for those who utilize M-Pesa, as creating a MShwari account requires logging onto M-Pesa, selecting “Loans and Savings” under the
menu option, and activating an account. Understanding its strong market share in the
telecommunication space, Safaricom looked to retain M-Pesa users with specific features
in M-Shwari. First, M-Shwari has a savings option, which M-Pesa users can transfer
between without fees. Goals can be met through the “‘Lock Savings Account’ option on
the M-Shwari menu.”174 This allows customers to earn interest of 7.35% on their savings,
which is paid every three months.175 However, M-Shwari is restricted to M-Pesa users
and can only be accessed after 6 months of an M-Pesa subscription. Additionally, MShwari’s loans have no interest fee and instead operate on a facility fee of 7.5%.176 MShwari provides banking services to the unbanked, but is a clear business with the
initiative of increasing M-Pesa customers.
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Additional alternative banking examples offered in Kenya are Tala and Branch,
which employ unique data other than past credit history to determine a customer’s credit
score. However, Tala is an American venture backed by corporations such as PayPal,
with offices in emerging markets such as Nairobi. Branch is also a Silicon Valley-based
startup operating in Nigeria, Mexico, and Tanzania. Both startups understood that
because of lack of institutions, lack of previous opportunities for credit, or lack of
knowledge and understanding of the credit and loan process, only 31% of the adult
population, especially in developing regions, were legitimately covered under credit
institutions.177 Therefore, Tala uses data such as “social connections, texts and calls,
merchant transactions, app usage, and personal identifiers.”178 While there has been
concern of personal data privacy with Tala, which they dispute with their “Data Ethics
Policy,” this readily available data has opened financial markets to a potential 3 billion
consumers.179 While Tala users can use M-Pesa to receive loans and SMS-confirmations,
it is not necessary to be associated with M-Pesa to start a Tala account and receive loans.
Branch uses a smartphone-based application to utilize machine learning and big
data to “assess people’s credit based on the explicit permission of customers’ smartphone
data. With no paperwork or red tape, our approval process is quick and gives people an
opportunity to build credit regardless of their banking history.”180 While Branch also
operates with an 100% transparency policy, their Kenyan operations offer no rollover
fees, loans from 250 Kenyan Shillings to 70,000 Kenyan shillings, 1%-14% monthly
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interest, and 4 to 68-week loan terms.181 Branch also utilizes M-Pesa and Facebook to
send confirmation messages and loans. However, Branch requires data points such as
Facebook account information, which displays the methods of an American, rather than
Kenyan venture. Both Branch and Tala may miss that approximately 69% of Kenyans do
not utilize social media and 88% do not personally own a computer, while M-Shwari
understands their market as M-Pesa users.182 However, by providing options for loans
and financial transactions, M-Shwari, Tala, and Branch have been able to tap into an
unaccredited market to allow for personal financial and overall economic growth.
In addition to financial growth and decentralized banking, M-Pesa and Safaricom
have recognized that Kenya will not shift completely away from a commodity-based
economy in the immediate future. Therefore, they have established technology
partnerships for Kenyans’ basic needs, such as agricultural information, which affects
almost 4 million farming households, or affordable energy.183 Founded by three women
and raising a $253,000 in seed funding in 2013, M-Farm utilizes the already-existing
mobile market to send SMS-based price updates and trends, as well as connecting
farmers to buyers and sellers based on their produce availability. While scholars such as
Aker and Jensen revealed the academic support for mobile technology reducing price
dispersion and arbitrage in commodity markets, applications such as M-Farm materialize
such findings. For $8, farmers receive a 6-month subscription to price trends and buying
networks for over 40 crops. In 2014, M-Farm and M-Pesa partnered to share backend
information and make the information-sharing process easier for the customer, many of
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whom already used and trusted M-Pesa.184 With approximately 20,000 users, M-Farm
users are expected to receive about two times more than what they would when dealing
with brokers because of the information shared and transparency about supply chain
logistics.185 M-Farm rivals the United Kingdom platform, WeFarm, which is the largest
digital network of farmers. The company operates worldwide and is an SMS-based
platform where farmers can answer each other’s questions, using crowdsourcing instead
of professional updates. WeFarm operates in several other developing regions beyond
Africa, but over 100,000 subscribers utilize the platform.
Finally, M-Pesa partnered with M-Kopa, a successful solar energy provider in
both Kenya and the East Africa region. M-Kopa functions similar to many of the SMSbased platforms popular in Kenya. It specifically “sells solar home systems on an
affordable mobile money payment plan, with an initial $35 deposit, followed by 365
payments of 45 cents. After completing the payment package, customers own a worldclass solar home system, with multiple lights, phone charging and a radio.”186 M-Kopa’s
goal is to address the need for affordable electricity for the 44% of Kenyans without it.187
Like M-Pesa, M-Kopa was initially backed by the United Kingdom’s Development Fund,
with the goal of providing infrastructure solutions in rural areas inadequately served by
the Kenyan government. The platform now has over 630,000 subscribers in the several
East African countries it operates in.188 As of January 2018, M-Kopa sold over 100,000
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photovoltaic solar panels that were made in Kenya by Solar corporation, Solinc, and
plans to move all solar panel operations domestically instead of importing solar panels.
The domestic shift created over 150 jobs in the Solinic factories and “subject to market
and regulatory conditions” they will plan to locally panel into the future.189
The success of solar companies is largely dependent on government-sponsored
initiatives and open energy regulation in response to the demand for clean energy. Mugo
Kibati, chairman of M-Kopa asserts, “Kenya has emerged as a hub for solar innovation.
The government has created an enabling environment for the solar sector and now we’re
seeing the impact and benefits flowing into the wider economy.”190 However, for those in
agriculture there are hard limits startups will face without further accountability and
development of institutions and infrastructure within Kenya. Co-founder of M-Farm,
Jamilia Abass, states, “without solving the most important components of the supply
chain, powerful technology and communications tools and solutions will flounder.”191
Specifically, Abass thinks, “the development of transport, cold storage, and other crucial
infrastructure should be a key priority for governments.”192 While technology can bridge
the initial knowledge gap and provide new resources to many, without further
development, agricultural growth for small farmers will plateau. The same holds true for
those using M-Pesa for business or personal savings; ultimately, for larger financial
growth, infrastructure such as sewage systems and roads will need to develop.
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VI. Comparing Kenya to Development in Other SSA Countries
While Kenya has seen major success with innovation and entrepreneurship, other
East African countries have seen varied results. This is partially because East Africa
tends to be one of the most reliant areas on aid, especially from institutions such as the
World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Mastercard Foundation.
While Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the lowest financial rates in the world, when aid
or grants for projects are not continued, many organizations shut down, as profits are too
marginal to successfully run. Kenya has experienced rapid success in mobile money,
decentralized banking, and technology innovation partially because the government has
continued to positively regulate transactions. However, other Sub-Saharan governments
have recently chosen to implement more restrictive measures. As such, it proves to be
more challenging to find the resources and support for startups compared to Nairobi.
In Uganda, the government only recently began to regulate mobile money and
fintech startups. In July 2018, Uganda’s finance ministry and Bank of Uganda passed a
law adding a 0.5% to 1% tax to each mobile money withdrawal.193 The government
stressed that the taxation is not on “sending, receiving, and depositing money,” after a
major public outcry against the original bill, which would have taxed more steps of the
transaction process. After protest, the finance ministry decided upon taxation on the
withdrawal step of the transaction. However, when passed, mobile money transactions
dropped almost 30% in a day.194 The Ugandan government also passed bills taxing access
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to global online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Google Hangouts,
Skype, and YouTube.195 While the government has attempted to respond and lower taxes,
there is intense public criticism on the 200 shilling per day tax. Prior to this regulation,
the only downward trend in mobile money occurred in 2015, when users who did not
properly register through the ‘Know Your Customer’ identification process were
disconnected from their platforms.
To protect consumers, Bank of Uganda passed Mobile Money Guidelines in 2011,
requiring that non-banks planning on issuing electronic money must partner with a
financial institution certified by the Bank of Uganda.196 Furthermore, “once the
necessary approval is obtained, mobile money is considered a financial institution
business and is thus regulated under the Financial Institutions Act.” 197 While these
guidelines were drafted to protect agency monopolies, there has been criticism of the
largest market shareholder, MTN, for corruption. In 2015, MTN was required to pay 2.3
billion shillings (approximately $662,000) to competitor EzeeMoney Limited for
malicious business behavior.198 Additionally, in 2015, several MTN employees were
found guilty for using the service for theft, embezzlement, and fraud.199
However, such scandals may be unsurprising for many Ugandans, as the
corruption perception index is 151 and many Ugandans believe their government to be
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“very corrupt.”200 Like Kenya, almost 60% of Uganda’s population is youth and
education rates tend to be higher than many African countries. Yet, “between 2009 and
2016, registered subscribers grew from about 600,000 to close to over 20 million
(equivalent to the adult population in the country). In other words, in less than a decade,
mobile money has effectively been adopted by the entire country.”201 The growth for
mobile subscribers between 2011 and 2016 was 610%; it was slower for mobile access to
reach Uganda, and therefore took longer for mobile platforms to become popular, but
once MTN telecommunications brought their first mobile payment application in 2009,
the popularity steadily grew.202 Currently, the mobile market is dominated by MTN and
Airtel.
Similar to microloans in Kenya and Tanzania, MTN partnered with the
Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) in 2016 to offer loans through MoKash, exclusive to
MTN subscribers.203 Additionally, in recognizing the challenges of inter-country
operators, MTN partnered with Safaricom for limited use of cross-country services;
through the partnership, MTN Uganda subscribers could only receive money from MPesa Kenya and MTN Rwanda.204 However, the effects of corruption and regulation are
evident when looking at the number of mobile and internet users compared to Kenya.
While 93% of Kenyans have mobile phone access, Uganda has “23.6 million mobile
phone subscribers, 17 million whom use the internet.”205 Only 69% of Ugandans own a
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mobile phone and 67% use it every day.206 Additionally, only 10.8% of Ugandan
individuals can access the internet at home, compared to 25% in Kenya.207
Even with taxation, mobile money options are prevalent although potentially less
successful than Kenya. For example, as of November 2018, M-Kopa registered its
100,000 Ugandan subscriber. 208 Health applications also play a crucial role in
government projects and nonprofit development work in Uganda. For example, the
SmartHealth App is utilized by Community Health Workers “to register members of a
household, record relevant health information… [guide] customer health assessments,
helping [health workers] to accurately identify and diagnose child illnesses and at-risk
pregnancies.”209 While mobile money may become less popular after taxation, other
entrepreneurial applications and uses of technology may become more prevalent in
developing the country.
Tanzania’s mobile money usage primarily differs in that there are six operators,
rather than one or two; as of 2016, Tanzania was the first country to become fully
interoperable. 210 For users, this means they have the ability to exchange mobile money
through different services with one another, making mobile money an incredibly popular
resource in both the formal and informal economies. Currently, Tanzania has six mobile
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money platforms offered through mobile network operators: M-Pesa, Tigopesa, Airtel
Money, Ezypesa, Halopesa, and TTCL Pesa. This market saturation leads to more
competitive rates as well as subscription options for the user, keeping pricing packages
fair. To compete for more business, several mobile operators teamed with central and
regional banks to provide microloans; M-Pesa and CBA provide loans through M-Pawa,
Airtel and Jumo Bank provide loans through Timiza, and Tigo and AFB Financial
provide loans through Nivushe.211 Tala, which also operates in Kenya, is another
available credit option for Tanzanians without previous credit history. Like farming
programs in Kenya, startups such as M-Kilimo provide similar information but adhere to
specific Tanzanian regulations.
Yet, while Tanzania has lenient regulations on entrepreneurial ventures, the
country enforces heavy regulation on the financial sector, including fintech. When first
introduced, there were no prohibitive measures enforced for electronic money transfer
platforms.212 Instead, “the electronic payment schemes guidelines were being used to
govern the area.”213 Yet, as of 2015, mobile money applications are subject to the
National Payment Systems Act, which is an “all-encompassing law for licensing,
compliance, enforcement, and matters of liability for breach of the law. It allows
companies, other than banks and financial institutions, to operate payment systems
in Tanzania by obtaining a license from the Bank of Tanzania.”214 Telecommunications
applications, which many mobile money platforms also fall under, must also adhere to
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the 2010 Electronic and Postal Communications Act. This requires that non-financial
institutions obtain electronic licenses, a process in which telecom companies with an
established presence can complete more easily than a single entrepreneur.
Additionally, Tanzania’s corruption index is 103, significantly lower than
Kenya.215 With more institutional support, Tanzanians are more likely to open bank
accounts and trust centralized banking under the Bank of Tanzania. As of 2015,
approximately 13 million users, or 26% of the population, have bank accounts in
Tanzania (compared to approximately 7 million in Kenya).216 While Kenya has less tax
incentives for an already crowded entrepreneurial space, Tanzania offers tax incentives
for startups as it would any other business. Under the Tanzania Investment Act of 1997,
tax incentives are offered to investors with investments in projects over $100,000 USD
for whole Tanzanian ownership or $500,000 USD for foreign ownership.217 The
institutional regulation for fintech, less crowded market for innovation, and competition
within the market leads to more options for Tanzanians when considering financial
options. However, 81% of Tanzanians own a mobile phone, 74% use it every day, and
77% of Tanzanians never use the internet. With such a high percentage of users, the
mobile phone and cellular applications still prove to be incredibly crucial to future
economic development in Tanzania.
Like many other East African countries, Tanzania is still heavily reliant upon aid,
but institutions such as the World Bank have begun to shift towards digital projects that
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will aid in keeping up with the technological revolution. For example, a World Bank
initiative, the Identification for Development partnership (ID4D) has begun to provide
$317 million in aid in the systemization of identification processes for those unregistered.
According to the Bank, “eighty percent of the one billion people without official ID live
in Africa and South Asia.”218 Identification programs are especially crucial to both
centralized and mobile banking, as without a registered identity, many are excluded from
the financial sector, which is highly linked to poverty. The initiative is backed by major
donors and “ID4D has forged partnerships with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
the Omidyar Network, and the Government of Australia, whose support brings thought
leadership and funding to this initiative.”219 Additionally, the World Bank’s digital
projects are still aiding in basic development efforts, without prioritizing factors such as
health and infrastructure below economic growth. For example, “the bank helped the
government use drones for geospatial mapping for flood preparedness, and also supported
the establishment of birth registration systems that provide baseline data to help target
anti-stunting programs.” 220 Birth registration and health is important as Tanzania
continues to develop and grow at one of the highest rates in the world. Tanzania is
growing at about 7% a year. The UNDP reports, “For growth to be inclusive, a significant
reduction in income inequality will have to go along with faster growth rates.”221
Through a combination of continuously holding institutions accountable, alternative
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option such as mobile banking, and technology-based aid, Tanzania has the potential to
continue to develop into a country for innovation and development.
Finally, cashless payments are becoming even more prevalent in Zimbabwe than
in Kenya. This may be because of the weaker institutions and higher corruption, as well
as lack of regulation for mobile payments in Zimbabwe. Currently, Zimbabwe ranks
154th on the corruption index, slightly higher than Kenya.222 Over 70% of the population
was unbanked in 2013.223 After the 2009 hyperinflation of the Zimbabwean dollar, where
bills were issued up to $100 trillion, Zimbabwe ended their dollar currency and began to
discourage the usage of the dollar in the economy. Instead, they shifted towards a multicurrency system.224 Traditionally, US dollars were accepted as cash, but with such a low
amount in circulation because of hyperinflation, many retailers began to accept mobile
payments as the best solution to the country’s liquidity problem. This was also in
response to the Zimbabwean government’s decision not to tax or strictly regulate mobile
money and decentralized banking after hyperinflation. Thus, “between 2011 and 2014,
financial inclusion grew from 60% to 77% largely due to mobile money.”225
In Zimbabwe, M-Pesa is not a mobile money option. However, EcoCash,
operated by Econet Wireless is the primary mobile money source that competes the stateoperated NetOne and Telcel Zimbabwe. In the past six years, its estimated that over $23

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index.”
Gabriel Kabanda et al., “Mobile Money in Zimbabwe: Integrating Mobile Infrastructure and Processes
to Organisation Infrastructure and Processes,” Online Journal of Social Sciences Research Volume 2 (April
30, 2013): 92–110.
224
“Zimbabwe Phasing out Local Currency,” British Broadcast Channel, June 12, 2015, sec. Africa,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33105400.
225
Paleo, “A Comparison of the Mobile Financial Services Sector in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda,” 2017.
222
223

64

billion dollars’ worth of transactions have occurred through EcoCash.226 Success is
partially because of each mobile money operator’s partnerships with financial
institutions; “Econet Wireless Zimbabwe‟s EcoCash partnered a number of banks among
them Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) and Stanbic Bank. Besides Zimpost outlets
NetOne’s One Wallet also partnered First Banking Corporation (FBC).”227 In 2014,
mobile money platforms accounted for 50 million transactions. In 2018, 1.7 billion
transactions “have been effected through mobile money in the country so far this year.”228
47% of Zimbabweans surveyed for the 2016 Afrobarometer do not have internet access,
84.3% own a mobile phone, and 71% use it every day.229
However, like other countries, the initial decision not to tax has more recently
shifted towards increasing regulation by the Zimbabwean government. This regulation
has not significantly impeded mobile money transactions, but in 2016, the Zimbabwean
government attempted to create revenue for development from the increasing mobile
market, introducing a “5% health tax levied from airtime and mobile internet top-ups.”230
As of October 2018, Zimbabwe shifted its regulatory policy to create additional revenue
for the government. Originally, tax was only 5 cents per transaction, but now it is “2
cents per dollar transacted.”231 As the government itself is struggling with debt over
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200% of its gross domestic product, taxing a service that has become somewhat inelastic
could become a source of revenue. Dr. Mambondiani, the CEO of “Steward Bank, a
retail-focused subsidiary of the country’s leading mobile operator, Econet,” described the
change, saying, “We were literally forced into a change of behavior… In June 2017, we
were averaging 10m transactions per month on our electronic platforms; by November
2017 we had reached 18m per month.”232 With the transition to mobile money, “only
about 20% of transactions were being done electronically, and the remaining 80% was
cash… But by 2017 the surge in electronic transactions saw that share rise to 80%, while
cash just accounted for 20% of transactions. It was driven by necessity, there was no
other option.”233 The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe reported that digital payment accounted
“for over 90% of the $97.5 billion in 2017.”234 When the EcoCash system crashed for
several days in July 2018, mobile money users flooded social media with pictures of
abandoned shopping carts and groceries as many lost their only source of currency.235
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe also decided to ban cryptocurrency, claiming
“bitcoin trade is risky and could have destabilizing effects on the financial system.”236
This halted a major deal for the Zimbabwean cryptocurrency platform, Golix, which
“halted its planned token sale to raise $32 million under an initial coin offering (ICO)
aimed at generating funds to expand across Africa.”237 Yet, even with heavy regulations,
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“mobile money transactions grew by 37.9% from Q1 to Q2 of 2018.”238 This displays the
country’s reliance on decentralized banking systems as liquidity issues and debt make
other currency options less plausible than in Uganda, Tanzania, or Kenya.
In Africa overall, only about 34% of the population above 15 had formal bank
accounts in 2015.239 Additionally, in Africa, “12% of adults in the region have a mobile
money account, which is four times the developing world average.” 240 In the rest of the
world, only 11% of mobile money accounts are used to both send and receive payments,
yet in Sub-Saharan Africa, this amount is over three times the world average at 35%.241
While many areas of North and West Africa have minimal mobile money users, (0%4%), East Africans heavily use mobile money (See Figure 1 below). This figure shows
that Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have over 30% mobile money account
penetration, while Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Cameroon, Congo, Nigeria, Niger,
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo and Benin have 0 to 4% mobile money
account penetration.242 This may be partially because East Africa faces corruption and
mild violence, but is more open to foreign aid and investment. Additionally, in West
African countries such as Nigeria, mobile money operators must be strictly licensed
banks from the central bank, instead of telecommunications operators. Since bank
operators already have less influence with such menial percentages of the population with
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bank accounts, their distribution channels are less effective. This reaffirms that in order
for mobile technology and innovation to gain traction within developing areas, support is
needed from the public and private sectors.

Source: Irina Asktrakhan, “Universal Financial Access by 2020? Look to Africa for Inspiration.” World Bank:
Africa Can End Poverty, May 12, 2016. Accessed December 4, 2018.
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VII. Conclusions: Recommendations for Continued Success in Technology,
Innovation, and Development
As African countries continue to develop, there is not one solution for the entire
continent, or each region. However, if certain principles are applied within the limits of
sovereignty, technology could potentially aid in providing solutions across finance,
health, education, and governance, all interrelated factors in the continuing development
across countries. While none of the data recorded is fully conclusive or statistically
correlated, certain patterns are worth further exploration.
First, digitalization has proven to be profitable, providing incentive for
investment. When nonprofits, private corporations, or governments decide to invest in
development, it is logical to seek profitable or measurable returns, which is increasingly
feasible with technology. Platforms themselves have grown significantly, but they also
provide increased economic output across education, health, and agriculture. This further
confirms Aker’s 2011 thesis that mobile access is higher than accessibility to traditional
forms of information. This also confirms Asongu’s 2015 conclusion that there are still
major business opportunities within the mobile sector of Africa, as almost every area of
life has been affected by technology. While data points have been inaccessible or
impossible to measure in the past because of lack of access, the digitalization of
information and data can lead companies to better understand the needs of consumers,
understand trends, and record information, leading to better products and higher profits.
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Globally, by 2020, “the increased use of digital technologies could add $1.4 trillion to
total global economic output.”243
Yet, there are limits to the developmental improvements that technology can
make without basic human needs being met. If basic development continues to lack in
healthcare, water, sewage, and transportation in Kenya, there will be a plateau of
economic output. Several of the top professionals in the technology development sector
confirm this. Reiterating co-founder of M-Farm, Jamila Abass’ conclusion, crucial
infrastructure needs to be prioritized to mitigate supply chain delays, but also to gain
access to services otherwise inaccessible. With M-Farm, Abass gives the example of
where technology fails to provide a perfect solution; “in Mau Narok, Kenya, where
farmers grew potatoes to fulfill their contract, yet were unable to deliver on time using
donkeys for transportation.”244 However, the combination of technology and smart
investment may be able to provide more access and knowledge to Kenyans about such
needs. In his 2016 Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture, Bill Gates confirmed this need,
stating,
“I’m inspired by the young African entrepreneurs driving startup booms in the
Silicon Savannahs from Johannesberg and Cape Town to Lagos and Nairobi. The
real returns, though, will come if we can multiply this talent for innovation by the
whole of Africa’s growing youth population. To make that a reality, all of
Africa’s young people must have the opportunity to thrive. If we invest in the
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right things—if we make sure the basic needs of Africa’s young people are taken
care of—then they can change the future and life on this continent will improve
faster than it ever has. In my view, there are four things that will determine
Africa’s future: health and nutrition, education, economic opportunity, and
good governance” 245
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, amongst others, invest heavily in the
technological innovation across these fields. However, countries in Africa and foreign
investors should still prioritize country values. Dambisa Moyo’s belief that Africa should
divert from all foreign aid, states that the, “trade-oriented, commodity-driven economies
like Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda (actually the majority of African countries) should look
at boosting trade with China and other emerging nations.”246 In the past decade, Chinese
investors have looked to expand their presence in Kenya during its economic growth with
projects to improve certain development deficiencies. One project, a railroad between
Nairobi and Mombasa, has gained significant exposure. This project aims to aid in one of
the most critical necessities for Kenyan development: infrastructure. However, Kenyan
newspapers report that “Chinese nationals have created a small kingdom in which they
run roughshod over Kenyan workers who say they are experiencing neo-colonialism,
racism and blatant discrimination.”247 To many Kenyans, this is especially offensive as
30 million Kenyan shillings a day (about 292,225 US dollars) are used from taxes
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towards the completion of the railroad. 248 Increased transportation will likely lead to
economic impact, but Kenya’s government should be careful as not to allow colonial
injustices to repeat themselves. Even with startups, those looking to create impact in the
area should consider constructivist values such as the cultural and societal aspects of
countries to establish socially responsible yet profitable businesses. As exemplified with
M-Pesa, understanding and respecting a consumer’s priorities and values can create better
products, consumer trust, and profitability.
This is also important when considering the benefits of collaboration and
information-sharing, which has been significant in investment and solutions in Kenya and
in Africa. This is becoming increasingly prevalent as startups succeed through publicprivate partnerships. Following the M-Pesa model, public-private partnerships have
helped cross boundaries that would otherwise be inaccessible without support from the
other sector. Recently, the Digital Economy for Africa Initiative launched under the
World Bank to bring together “African governments, development organizations,
bilateral donors, and the private sector to support building the foundations for digital
economies in African countries.”249 In discussing investing in African technology, Bill
Gates stated, “Whatever form innovation takes, one thing is certain; it’s harder to do in
isolation. Real, lasting change requires collaboration.”250 Just as development itself is
multifaceted, utilizing intersectional knowledge can help to provide feasible, impactful
change.
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Even as M-Pesa grows, it has repeatedly looked for collaborations both inside and
outside of the technology space. In April 2018, M-Pesa looked to expand financial
accessibility globally through its collaboration with PayPal, allowing for M-Pesa users to
securely transfer funds between accounts. Domestically, M-Pesa is looking to expand
services for small businesses, and encouraging others to follow suit. Head of the M-Pesa
Foundation, Les Basille, stated, “we have recognized that Micro Small Medium
Enterprise (MSME) are key drivers in the growth of our economy and creation of
employment. I therefore encourage the organizations present to promote and work closely
with the MSME.”251 Such statements may reveal that while M-Pesa’s collaborations are
profit-driven, they also emphasize attention to Kenya specifically.
Additionally, open regulation, political trust, and government support may be key
to technological advances and innovation. With political distrust still very low in many
African countries, including Kenya, technology has room to empower voters as platforms
like Sheriasoft materialize. Many social scientists agree that democracy has a strong
correlation with economic development.252 Ultimately, political change and government
transparency is contingent upon political participation, use of force or lack thereof, and
trust, but with technology, a broader audience has the potential to participate. This may
also be because technology and mobile payments also have a significant effect on time;
while payments for local services, birth registrations, and licenses could require days in
countries with inefficient local government, mobile payments have cut down the time
required to participate in basic government programs.
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While imperfect, the Kenyan government is still somewhat responsible for mobile
money’s success. The Central Bank of Kenya’s decision to work with M-Pesa and
telecommunication operators entering the financial realm rather than against them, even
if it first involved the risk of flexibility in regulation, allowed for innovative success.
Countries like Uganda and Zimbabwe which have since tightened regulation, have
experienced protests and citizen pushback. Moving forward, to enhance governance,
parties may want to consider delivering information through already existing platforms. If
local offices could contact or deliver information with SMS alerts, they could potentially
enhance political participation or send messages about schooling. Similar to how M-Farm
delivers pricing information, other nonprofits, organizations, and companies could send
messages with health information, schedules, or events. Such platforms would lead to
stronger workforce and civil engagement. Yet, companies should hold themselves to the
highest standard when considering consumer privacy. Workforce engagement platforms,
whether public or privately owned, must be opted into, as forced messaging could lead to
more rather than less corrupt practices when delivering information.
These concerns are similarly raised when analyzing anti-monopoly concerns. MPesa gained trust because it was not a government institution, but rather an innovation by
a recognized telecommunication operator. Unlike Tanzania with several major operators,
Safaricom was initially one of two major operators. For this reason, in 2016, “, the
Competition Authority of Kenya ordered Safaricom to open its network of M-Pesa agents
to the other telecom companies offering mobile money services. A year later, telecom
operators reached an agreement that allows users to exchange money regardless of

74

whether both parties to the transaction have the same provider.” 253 Regulatory issues
vary from country to country, but holding corporations accountable may be equally as
important as government accountability in future development.
Other concerns with the digitalization of development must also be addressed.
Automation of jobs is a global concern, and with the rise of technology, will only become
more prevalent. The World Bank has estimated that “two-thirds of all jobs in developing
countries are susceptible to automation, with numbers as high as 85 percent in some
countries.”254 With technology becoming increasingly accessible, it is important to create
educational opportunities to learn how to work with it, rather than against it. The Council
for Foreign Relations concluded that by 2034, “Africa will have a labor force larger than
China or India. But the long-held assumption that African states would capitalize on their
demographic dividend by building up their manufacturing sector and using it to drive
development the same way Asian states did has run aground on the realities of twentyfirst century automation.”255 This shifted development pattern should be addressed
through increased education and policymaking to address the future sectoral shifts. Some
development specialists argue that “workers themselves should be at the center of this
planning,” warning that “getting this wrong could deepen society’s divisions and
exacerbate inequality, political polarization, instability, and even global insecurity. It will
also negatively impact millions of workers — profoundly and personally.”256 However,
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unlike many developed regions facing this issue, with such a youth bulge in Kenya,
technology skills should be emphasized earlier on and further educational opportunities
should be offered to maximize future employment opportunities. With spaces like iHub,
Kenyans have the chance to learn the skills necessary to move towards future
development. Providing aid through modeling additional learning centers like the iHub
could be a feasible solution if effective policymaking fails.
Additionally, while many startups are tailored to local solutions, some are
concerned about the ability to compete in a global market. The United Nations
Development Program notes, “the combination of technology and globalization has
driven an explosion in international trade, much of which linked to global value chains.
More than 80% of global trade flows through multinational corporations, and one in five
jobs around the world is tied to global value chains.”257 This should be a consideration in
future global trade in East Africa, but many Kenyan startups and businesses have
succeeded by first testing their products locally, iterating upon a local model, and
expanding at-scale rather than attempting to dominate markets immediately. Even now,
many of the dominant mobile payment operators in Africa are only first beginning to
offer interoperability, inter-regional payment options, and global collaborations. This is
true for M-Pesa, which recognized that its model could be applied to many unbanked
populations and now operates beyond Africa in countries such as Afghanistan and India,
though it is less successful than in Kenya. Additionally, trying to invest too much in a
startup that may not gain traction should be avoided. Instead of investing in domestic
infrastructure that may have been too costly and risk-averse, M-Solar only recently
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decided to produce solar panels domestically, recognizing their expanding capabilities,
high consumer demand, and profitability. By building and testing at-scale, companies can
ultimately produce better, more efficient products.
Finally, as with most of the technology worldwide, data and privacy concerns
need to be monitored as fintech moves forward in developing nations where corruption is
prevalent. M-Pesa invested heavily and iterated on security measures as concerns arose.
Additionally, with its partnership with the Central Bank of Kenya, concerns of lost
money can be addressed through a secure, detailed process. Knowing that their consumer
base understood the risks of transporting cash, M-Pesa invested heavily and iterated on
security measures for incidents of phone loss, hacking, or theft. With its partnership with
the Central Bank of Kenya, concerns of lost money can be addressed through a secure,
detailed process. According to Safaricom, “if a customer loses his/her phone or SIM card,
the funds in his/her M-Pesa account remain secure, and cannot be accessed without the
secret PIN code. M-Pesa will restore these funds after providing a new SIM card and
resetting the mobile phone account.”258 Additional concerns of money laundering for
illegal organizations are valid, but can be mitigated with higher software standards. With
a combination of encryption technologies and SIM tracking, fraud and laundering can be
more easily flagged in systems. M-Pesa management asserts that "suspected or actual
fraud stands at less than 0.006 percent of all recorded transactions with a downward
trend."259 Furthermore, “every transaction is traceable and tools have been provided to
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Safaricom to monitor suspicious activity. Customers use a PIN when processing
transactions and are required to repeat a secret password when they call customer care.
All transactions are securely encrypted by the SIM application toolkit so there is little risk
of interception when the messages are being transmitted.”260 High security measures also
allow for increased consumer trust and product demand. Especially with advanced
hacking technology, if systems are not continuously updated and secured, this could pose
a massive economic stability problem.
In the future, technology companies will also need to prioritize mitigating crashes
and bugs. When the EcoCash system crashed in Zimbabwe, thousands were left without
their source of basic income, causing several days without food for many. If mobile
money continues the trend of replacing real cash, backup plans for crashes must be
enacted if systems do shut down. The International Finance Corporation reports that
“About 4.3% of users have reported that their money was transferred to the wrong
recipient and only 1/3 of these users have managed to recover these funds. Although
customers perceive this to be the fault of Safaricom, in most cases it is a result of user
error. Nonetheless, this type of situation reduces the customer’s trust in the platform so
Safaricom is working to proactively address these cases and assist users in the return of
their funds.”261 Bugs in all systems are inevitable; even technology giants such as
Facebook, Google, and Twitter have faced crashes, security breaches, and system
outages. However, as companies build capital, a significant amount of resources should
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be invested in ensuring data and privacy security, as well as trusted customer service
resources to provide help when outages or crashes do occur.
These concerns are valid as both the developed and developing regions face the
risks involved with technology investment and use. However, platforms that have
impacted the way humankind acts, thinks, and interacts were all once risky startups as
well. Ultimately, technology is not the entire answer to alleviating poverty and bringing
basic access to developing nations. Development needs to be holistically considered, but
technology and innovation have provided a platform for expedited success across sectors.
Technology can be incredibly useful when considering future steps in development
across finance, education, healthcare, and governance. With that in mind, if abused,
technology could potentially harm those most in need. Based on the trends presented, the
shift towards digitalization is propelling Kenya and other developing nations forward. In
considering the future path of development, consider one of the main takeaways of Davos
2016; “Technology is not a silver bullet. How helpful it is depends on how you use it.”262
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